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CONVERSATIONS ON 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Locating Duterte in Davao 
An Interview with Jose Jowel Canuday 
Since our last issue, the new strongman president of the Philippines, Rodrigo 
Duterte, has captured the attention of local and international news. He has 
been a controversial president, waging a war on drugs that has led to as 
many as 7,000 deaths according to some news reports and human rights 
advocates. Commentators in the Philippines and abroad continue to ask: 
What explains his continued popularity?
For this installment of “Conversations on the Global South,” our Managing 
Editor, Jose Jowel Canuday (JC) removes his editorial hat and recalls the 
many years he spent as a journalist in Duterte’s home city of Davao. Prior 
to being an academic, Canuday was a pioneering journalist in Davao, 
covering various issues from agrarian reform, displacement, and human 
rights. For this interview, he talks to editor Lisandro E. Claudio (LC)
about the local politics that gave birth to the Duterte legend. 
LC:  You were a journalist prior to becoming an academic. When did 
you start with journalism and what kind of topics did you cover?  
JC:  I started in 1989, when I was still a university student.  I covered 
various topics of concern in Davao and Mindanao more broadly. I 
reported on human rights, labor issues, agrarian reform, local politics, 
even entertainment. 
LC:  But your main focus was human rights?  
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JC:  Yes, in (the) late 1980s and early 90s. 
LC:  What were the major human rights issues you uncovered when you 
first started reporting in Davao? 
JC: They were mostly related to agrarian reform. As a result of problems in 
rural areas, peasant leaders and organizers were being killed. I also covered 
some labor issues. Many labor leaders were being summarily executed.
There were also several instances of forced displacement, because of 
military operations, especially in areas where the communist New People’s 
Army (NPA) was active.  
LC:  What caused the jump in violence during this period? 
JC:  The violence in Davao dates back to the early 1980s, during the 
groundswell of opposition to the Marcos regime. Several journalists 
and academics note that Davao was then being used as a laboratory for 
communist strategy (for urban warfare). 
The Maoist communist party usually focuses on revolutionary 
activity in the countryside. But in Davao, they were trying out urban 
insurrection. There was massive mass-based organizing in many of the 
city’s communities, particularly in informal settlements. Most of the 
warm bodies that joined protests came from those areas.  
So, the combination of the insurrectionist experimentation, mass 
organizing, and military reprisal in and around Davao, I think, created the 
conditions of violence. 
LC:  And would you say this was a context that allowed for the emergence 
of Rodrigo Duterte as a popular politician in Davao? 
JC:  Not in the beginning, at least not during the time I’m describing. I 
didn’t cover him then because I was still young, but based on conversations 
with older journalists, they initially failed to notice Duterte. He was just 
in the sidelines.  
The only thing they said was that he seemed a bit different from 
the other lawyers who were critical of the Marcos regime. They did not 
see him as potentially occupying a leadership position, but they were 
intrigued by him. 
For one, he was one of the city prosecutors, so he was working for the 
government, for the regime. And yet he was always out there… 
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LC:  “Out there?” Meaning he was protesting against Marcos?  
JC:  He joined the so-called “parliament of the streets.” It’s important 
to note that his mother was quite active in the Marcos opposition—one 
of the pillars of Davao’s parliament of the streets. Some reports that 
surfaced in the post-Marcos years noted that while being a Marcos-
era prosecutor, Duterte also arranged for meetings between foreign 
journalists and the NPA.  
Duterte himself figured more prominently after the collapse of 
the Marcos regime. The new president, Cory Aquino, appointed him 
officer-in-charge of the Vice Mayor’s office. 
LC:  Can you describe to me Duterte’s road to power? How did he 
become mayor of Davao? 
JC:  I was still in high school when he became OIC vice mayor. I didn’t 
know much about politics then, and I wasn’t tracking his career.
He was in the news sometimes, but most of the coverage was about 
the OIC mayor. 
LC:  Who was the OIC Mayor?  
JC:  Zafiro Respicio. Duterte became better known when he ran against 
Respicio for mayor in the 1987 elections. But he was still relatively 
obscure. Respicio was very popular in the city center, what we call the 
poblacion area in Davao, where my family lived. That area was all Respicio. 
He enjoyed blanket media coverage, and he was the topic of household 
and domestic conversations. Not many people talked about Duterte. 
Of course when he won the 1987 elections, Duterte became the talk 
of the town. The question then was: How did he do it? 
LC:  So how did he do it?  
JC: Respicio seemed to be the anointed candidate of Cory Aquino; she 
raised his hand in one of the rallies. And yet Duterte won because he 
focused his campaign on the countryside and areas with a lot of informal 
settlements. So, for example, he campaigned significantly in District II, 
which had a large rural section, but also a big industrial zone with a 
lot of informal settlements. Areas like this were highly-populated and 
dense. 
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He seemed to have an intuitive sense of demographics. He knew he 
didn’t have a chance in the city center, which had the largest segment of 
the electorate. And yet he also knew that if he took Districts I and II, he 
could win the race even without the support of the poblacion. 
LC:  So when did you start covering him and what kind of stories were 
you running early on?
JC: I started covering him when I was already working with the 
professional press. I was still a student, but I was affiliated with a news 
agency that focused on human rights violations. 
LC:  What year was this? 
JC: I started in ’89. But I didn’t cover most of the Duterte action. The 
legend-making, I think, started after he assumed the mayorship in 1988 
and continued throughout ’89. 
1989 was the tail-end of the period of multiple summary executions 
in Davao I was describing earlier. That was when I started reporting. We 
were still seeing a lot of human rights violations and violence, though 
mostly outside of the city. The more significant reports of violence in 
the city during this period were incidences of bomb explosions and the 
alleged summary execution of inmates who took hostage and killed some 
religious missionaries, including an Australian national, in the city jail.  
LC:  Were many of the human rights violations perpetrated by the 
military?   
JC: It was mixed. At the time, people saw them as military-driven. But a 
lot of the violations were also committed by paramilitary groups, widely 
believed to be sanctioned by the military. We called them vigilantes, 
anti-communist vigilantes. 
LC: And how did Duterte factor in in this context? 
JC: He was significant. For one, he won in areas perceived to be 
dominated by the vigilantes, although nobody exactly saw him, at first 
while in the campaign trail, as being a patron or an ally of the vigilantes. 
He was strange in that he spoke both the language of the communists 
and the anti-communists.  
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LC:  What do you mean by that? 
JC:  He could talk to the communists, but he could also influence the 
vigilantes. In fact, he closely associated with the vigilante group Alsa 
Masa. 
The Alsa Masa were the main anti-communist vigilante group in 
Davao, probably even Mindanao. Duterte was able to reach out to 
them, without exactly alienating the Left. So the Alsa Masa respected 
him, but the NPA did not see him as an enemy. 
He was able to work with these conflicting forces. It wasn’t very 
clear at the time how he did it, because the environment was very 
polarized. 
LC:  So how did he pull it off?  What did he promise? He must have 
promised things to both organizations to curry their favor. 
JC: He supported and financed the Alsa Masa when he became mayor. 
LC:  Military support?  
JC: The tone was “We believe in your cause and we are with you.” I’m 
not sure if he provided material support in terms of arms. But there 
might have been some material support in the form of allowances, a 
little funding here and there. Then again, the Davao City government 
did not have a lot of money to spend. This was before 1991 and the 
implementation of the Local Government Code; expenditures were 
being determined mostly (at) the national level. 
So anyway, he knew how to cultivate ties with the military and the 
anti-communists. But, at the same time, he did not lose track of the 
fact that he had a communist constituency. 
LC:  So how did he attend to this communist constituency? 
JC: In fact, I just recently reviewed a book about this. Based on the 
book and other stories I was reading at the time—because I was 
not really an eyewitness—he intervened whenever mass movement 
or communist leaders got arrested or had run-ins with authority. 
Sometimes, he would take custody of them himself. If they got sent 
to jail, he would shield them from abuses. And he also helped them 
navigate the legal system and the courts. 
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LC:  So it seems like his role or the service he provided in this highly 
polarized atmosphere was arbitration.
JC: Yes, essentially. But not just with the communists, even with other 
conflicting groups in the city. The media was focused on the communist 
vs. anti-communist dynamic, but there were other divisions in the 
city. Among them were those between different ethnic and religious 
formations: the different Muslim groups, different indigenous peoples. 
To address these divisions, which at times turned violent and resulted in 
armed kin-based conflicts, Duterte finance a broad-based structure of 
arbitrators ambiguously referred as “deputy mayors.” Duterte carefully 
selected and appointed deputy mayors for each of some two dozen 
ethnic groups in Davao. These deputy mayors represented him, settling 
kin-based conflicts on his behalf— extremely critical operations given 
that the violence had the tendency to proliferate and interplay with 
ideological and political struggles such as those waged by the NPA 
and variants of Moro rebel formations that also operated in some parts 
of Davao City and its neighboring areas. Duterte, however, did not 
invent this arbitration structure; it was a couple of his predecessors 
(who crafted and executed it), one of which was born to an indigenous 
group in the city. The clever thing about Duterte is that he understood 
the various sources of polarization in the city. He knew if it was an 
ethnic conflict, a political conflict, and he knew when these conflicts 
intersected with each other. He was able to see the complexity. Davao’s 
deputy mayor system of arbitration, though referred in another name, 
has been replicated elsewhere in Mindanao with significant Muslim 
and indigenous population(s). 
LC:  Does that mean there was then a reduction of vigilante violence 
in the first few years of Duterte as mayor? 
JC: The deputy mayors, shall I say, were the alternative(s) to 
vigilantism that Duterte sustained alongside and beyond the shelf-life 
of vigilantes. Anti-communist vigilante formations expanded in the 
years before, during, and deep into Duterte’s mayoral administration. 
Duterte, upon assuming office in 1988, went on to patronize and 
finance the Alsa Masa with tacit approval of the national government, 
including then President Corazon Aquino, who hailed its formation 
and even visited the vigilante’s group birthplace in a slum community 
in Davao’s Agdao district. On the year that Duterte became Alsa 
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Masa benefactor, the group’s grip over the city also waned. Gradually, 
a different atmosphere emerged in the city. It wasn’t that the statistics 
of anti-communist vigilante killings going down. Frankly, I was not 
exactly sure what the trend was, but clearly there was a different 
atmosphere. It was about this growing sense that people felt much 
safer. And the tenor of politics changed. So, gradually, the airwaves 
became less polarized. Gradually, the sandbags and checkpoints on the 
streets disappeared. 
LC:  And what became of vigilante groups like the Alsa Masa?
JC: Some of them worked with the city government; they were 
absorbed. Others were hired by security groups, both communists and 
anti-communists together in one security group.  
LC:  So a lot of them, in effect, were demobilized. 
JC: In a sense, yes. Some of them went back to farming. Some of 
them just became barangay leaders. Some of them were killed. Some 
of them put up small businesses. 
LC:  And in your opinion, how much did Duterte contribute to the 
demobilization of these various armed groups? 
JC: There was no clear order from the mayor’s office to demobilize. 
It was more like he helped create an atmosphere whereby both the 
communists and the anti-communists would no longer be relevant as 
warring armed groups. So they morphed into something else gradually, 
not as a result of any specific policy.  
LC:  I want to move on now to the emergence of the killing of 
suspected criminals. When did you start noticing suspected criminals 
dying in Davao?
JC: ’96. I think there were some killings in ’95 and a few years 
earlier. Although I wasn’t actively covering Duterte in ’95; I was 
doing something else.  But sometime after the summer months in 
’96, probably around October, we started noticing killings every day. 
These killings were done by motorcycle-riding assassins: There was the 
driver, and the gunman would be the passenger. 
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It was a series of killings. Witnesses and police told us that the 
killers would leave behind notes claiming to be the “Servants of the 
people – Suluguon sa katawhan” in Bisaya. 
The killings were almost direct copies of the executions in 
‘84/’85—slayings attributed to urban partisans of the NPA called 
Sparrow Units. The Sparrows, likewise, left messages claiming that 
they were servants of justice and that they were killing the enemies of 
the people. 
Someone on the radio said the killings were very similar to the 
targeted killings of Alsa Masa members in the mid 80s. 
LC: Who did these riding-in-tandem gunmen kill?
JC: According to the police, these were suspected drug dealers and 
pushers. Some were small time street pushers, not necessarily big 
fish, but they were known to be prolific drug sellers. Some said were 
suspected local drug lords, selling, primarily, methamphetamine, shabu. 
So it began with suspected illegal drug dealers. But sometime 
in the late ’90s, a few suspected snatchers and hold-uppers were also 
gunned down. Their ages didn’t matter; some were minors. Some of 
these people were recidivists, people who went in and out of jail. They 
were also targeted. 
What is interesting is that, when we started reporting about 
the killings, people initially referred to them as vigilantes. And then 
someone from radio, for some reason, called them a “death squad.” 
And since this was happening in Davao, the media started calling the 
killers the “Davao Death Squad.” 
The term (was) lifted from the language of earlier reports about 
the Philippines. I think there was this report by Ramsey Clark – the 
American human rights lawyer and former US attorney general - on 
“death squads” during the Cory Aquino period. So the term “death 
squad” was already familiar in Davao. 
LC:  But how accurate was this term? Davao Death Squad? Was there 
really a death squad behind these killings?
JC: Not the kind of “squad” we were familiar with during the Cory 
Aquino years. 
LC:  Meaning? 
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JC: Meaning, the death squads, like the Alsa Masa, had members 
who openly claimed they were with Alsa Masa. They had assemblies; 
they patrolled the streets; they set up check points. 
LC: They patrolled the streets as units…
JC: As units, and that is why they were called a squad. The new 
killers did not organize this way. They were not units. You wouldn’t 
even have been able to call them an organization. And they definitely 
were not political (that) the Alsa Masa and other anti-communist 
vigilante groups were. The anti-drug gunmen did not have a clear 
ideology, and you did not know what kind of politics they were 
playing. 
The term “Davao Death Squad,” in a sense, was just the media’s 
shorthand to describe the killers. We already had the vocabulary from 
the 1980s, so it was easy. But, really, these killings were quite different. 
At the same time, we were trying to adjust our language to this new 
phenomenon. At one point, we stopped using the word “salvaging” 
to describe them. 
LC:  For the people who don’t know what “salvaging” is, please clarify. 
JC: Salvaging referred to, at least in Davao, the summary executions 
of the late Marcos years, from ’83 to ’85. Bodies would be dumped in 
a grassy area or in a body of water. 
LC:  Why did you drop the term “salvaging?” Weren’t these acts of 
salvaging?  
JC: In salvaging, people are usually kidnapped, killed, and then 
dumped elsewhere. The new killings were pointblank, done in front 
of crowds, sometimes in daylight. 
LC: I see. So these killers, did you ever find out who they were? 
JC: We kept asking the police, almost like broken records. They 
would tell us that they had no leads, because the witnesses to the 
killings refused to cooperate. 
There was this one guy—I forget his name—who was arrested 
and went to court. Not sure if he was convicted; I can’t remember. 
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LC:  When did rumors start to circulate that these killers were 
associated with the mayor? 
JC: Nobody could figure out what was driving these killings. At one 
point, I think, some guys in radio started discussing the rumor. 
LC:  What was the insinuation?
JC: That since Duterte was close to the Alsa Masa, and the pattern 
of violence was similar to the violence from ’84-’87, one could put 
two and two together. 
And then there was this one time in ‘90s when there was this 
incident on Duterte’s Sunday TV program on ABS-CBN Davao. 
The show was set up in such a way that there was a female host 
who served as Duterte’s interlocutor. There was no mobile text 
messaging at the time, and, although you could call in, it was difficult. 
So it was mostly the host and the mayor. Normally the questions the 
host asked were related to issues coming out on the media.
Since the killings were happening a lot at that time, they were on 
everyone’s minds. So, naturally, he was repeatedly asked about these 
deaths in several episodes. 
LC:  What year was this? 
JC: Already in the late ‘90s, not sure exactly what year. So he was 
asked if city hall had something to do with the killings. He said 
something to the extent of “For all we know, these guys were killed 
by the relatives of the addicts these drug peddlers (had) victimized. 
This may just be a reaction to the proliferation of drugs; they might 
have organized themselves.” So it seemed like tacit endorsement. 
He would slip out a caveat at some point in these interviews that he 
is not condoning the killings but would also not condemn or take 
action against this form of violence. 
Then there was this other important episode when he appeared 
on air with a list of names from the prosecutor’s office and the local 
police office. He claimed that this list consisted of names of who had 
been charged in court of drug peddling/pushing. He read the list on 
air. Many of the people on it were already in jail. Some were not. The 
list also included people who had already been killed by motorcycle-
riding gunmen. A few days after he revealed the names, some people 
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on the list were killed including those who managed to get out of 
jail through bail or other means. When asked about it, he said “Like 
I told you, the families must be really mad. All I’m doing is telling 
you who these guys are, and that they have pending cases. I may have 
read the names on TV, but this is public record.”
LC:  Just to add some macabre levity to this conversation, you 
mentioned to me before that it wasn’t just human beings being 
killed by these vigilantes in Davao. Weren’t there also incidents of 
dog killings? 
JC: Yeah, during the same period.  
Just to provide some background, Duterte used to spend one day 
a week meeting various constituencies. They would come to city hall 
seeking, mostly, medical assistance. 
One summer, he noticed that a good number of people who 
asked him for help were in need of anti-rabies medication. The 
Department of Health at one point confirmed that there was a 
spike in rabies infections in Davao. They explained that, since it was 
summer, most children were not in school and were, instead, playing 
in the streets. 
So Duterte appears on TV again. This time, apart from his usual 
warnings directed at drug pushers, he also warned dog owners, 
asking them to tie up their dogs and have them injected with anti-
rabies vaccines. 
LC:  Presumably he was cursing as he was doing this? 
JC: Yes. He always cursed, that was just the standard fare.
Anyway, despite his warning, rabies continued to spike. At one 
point he said, “Something will happen to your dogs if you don’t 
follow my demand to tie them up.” And then, there was this one day 
when several stray dogs were poisoned at night, and were found dead 
the next day. 
Soon after that, dog owners made sure to tie their dogs. 
LC: And what did you call this movement behind the dog killings? 
JC: Someone else from the radio again called it the “Davao Dog 
Squad.” It came out on the national broadsheets; it was DDS as well.
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LC:  Apart from suspected drug pushers and dogs, were there any 
other targets?   
JC: There were forms of violence that did not lead to killings. One day, 
I was walking down the street and I heard gunshots. I thought, “Okay, 
more vigilante killings.” 
I saw people swarming around a street corner. When I went to 
check what had happened, nobody was dead, but there was a stalled 
jeepney with its oil gushing out. Apparently, there were several 
complaints on TV about speeding drivers, especially public utility 
jeepney drivers in the outskirts of the city. And there was this one time 
when four or five students were killed all at once by a speeding jeepney. 
The mayor got very angry. Soon after, we get to see a few scenes 
of a speeding jeepney driver stopping in front of a traffic light, a man 
would take out a pistol or an automatic rifle and shoot at the engine. 
LC:  These are interesting stories that really shed light on what 
Duterte was like.  But what I want to get into now is the question of 
acceptance. So if a lot of Davaoeños already suspected that Duterte 
was behind these killings, how come he remained popular? And how 
come in certain parts of Davao society these killings were acceptable? 
JC: It stems from the idea that the city, the region had seen worse 
times: the Marcos era, the rise of the communists, urban insurrection 
units—there was plenty of violence before. The streets were militarized. 
It was difficult to go out at night. And you had this sense that, at any 
moment, society—even the country—would collapse. 
When Duterte came, that changed. The Alsa Masa succeeded in 
pushing back the communists. Afterwards, Duterte sort of shepherded 
the Alsa Masa from being a vigilante unit to a group of roaming city 
guards. At one point, the sandbags were gone, and the atmosphere of 
uncertainty was no longer there. 
Drugs had also become a big problem. Though the media initially 
didn’t talk about the issue, the informal settlers knew about the 
problem. At one point, there was a realization that drugs were, indeed, 
a concern. And so people just said good riddance when some pushers 
were killed. And as more and more pushers and users felt threatened, 
they started leaving our community, going elsewhere. 
So beyond the feeling that the communist vs. anti-communist 
problem had been addressed, people also felt more secure because 
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criminality was being tackled. And there was this sense that people 
benefited, regardless of the methods being used. 
So because the city had seen worse, what became important then, 
and I think even now, was the outcome. 
LC:  I want to talk about the national situation. I know you have not 
been a journalist for a long time now. But I’d still like to ask you to 
compare what’s happening now with what happened in Davao. What 
are the differences and the similarities between Duterte’s local drug 
war in Davao and his current national drug war as president?
JC: The warnings against the drug lords are there. That’s signature 
Duterte.  
But the way the killings have been carried out is quite different 
from how it was in Davao. As I said, the killings in Davao were mainly 
carried out by motorcycle-riding gunmen. But here, in Manila, the 
methods are quite mixed. 
Actually, when I look at this drug war, it seems primarily 
concentrated in Manila. The Davao killings have continued, but they 
are less compared to before. So this violence is primarily concentrated 
in the National Capital Region. 
Going back, the crucial difference relates to the police. The police 
hardly figured in the Davao killings. But here in Manila, the deaths are 
usually the result of police raids, supposedly buy-bust operations. They 
didn’t do as much buy-bust operations in Davao. Maybe there were a 
few, but that wasn’t a common method. 
LC:  And there were no suspicions that the members of the “Davao 
Death Squad” were also members of the police squad?  
JC: No, not really. In fact, the suspicion there was that the gunmen 
were probably former NPA Sparrow members, because their methods 
were similar. 
My suspicion was that the Davao killings were not too different 
from hired killings elsewhere. The pattern was very similar to, for 
example, the killing(s) of media people during the Cory Aquino, Fidel 
Ramos, Gloria Arroyo, and Noynoy Aquino years. 
Unlike Manila today, Davao did not see people being packed with 
tape.  And there was also more certainty there that those killed were 
known pushers in the communities. It’s a little bit different here. 
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LC:  So very little of what Duterte would now label “collateral damage.” 
JC: Well, there probably was, but not like here where bullets fly off in 
multiple directions and hit other people. It wasn’t like that. 
But, in terms of the targets, there are some parallels. In both cases, 
those dying included small-fry drug pushers, some recidivists, and some 
dealers with more resources and wealth. 
LC:  The pattern of acceptance, though, is similar, according to the data. 
Most people are against killing, but most people endorse the drug war. 
And while they endorse the drug war, most of them are also afraid of 
being killed. There are so many contradictions in the data. Can you help 
us make sense of this? 
JC: I don’t think those are contradictions. The data makes perfect 
sense. If you ask people about these issues, they talk about their values. 
I learned this in Davao. The values are always, well, Catholic, and they 
are likely to object to violence and killings. But then, some think that 
the killings are justified. People do not publicly endorse the killings. But 
in other conversations, they might say it’s just right that some of these 
people get killed. 
LC:  So they are against the notion of killing, but they approve when 
the corner adik gets murdered? 
JC: Because of the results. They may have, for example, seen substantive 
changes in security. So I think the values kick in when they say they 
don’t approve of the killings. But it’s practically the results that get them 
to support the drug war. 
LC:  Do you think the support is going to last long? Is it going to 
erode? And how long will Duterte be able to use the issue of drugs to 
maintain popularity?
JC: I saw Duterte in Davao, and I’m also looking at him now—he’s 
not one-dimensional. Well, some critics say he’s a single-issue politician 
and that he can’t multitask. But even nationally he seems to be doing 
multiple things at the same time. So, in Davao, his popularity didn’t rest 
only on his capacity to hold back both the communists and the anti-
communists, or his crackdown on criminality. There was also economic 
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and social development, and he absorbed the pet causes of some civic 
groups like child welfare, women’s protection, LGBT rights, and a 
range of other concerns.
I think his success or failure nationally may not hinge on the drug 
war, but on how successful he will be on other fronts. 
LC: I know this is a very unpredictable presidency, but if you were to 
predict something about what’s going to happen in the next five years, 
what would it be? 
JC: I hesitate to hazard a prediction. This is now the national game, so 
it’s a little bit different, and you have to have all the facts. I don’t have 
that. 
LC:  You told me in one of our many prior conversations that you are 
finding it more and more difficult to read Duterte these days compared 
to before. 
JC: Yes, because of many matters, like, for instance, geopolitics. No one 
predicted that Hillary Clinton would lose, but she did. During the US 
presidential campaign, it seemed like Duterte’s pivot to China made no 
sense. But now, with Trump as president, it does.  
Here’s the thing: I’m quite surprised by the shrewdness that Duterte 
has exhibited outside Davao, on the international level. For the longest 
time, he was barely a national figure, much less a regional one, much less 
a global one. But in six months, things have changed. 
LC:  Isn’t that primarily because of his mouth? 
JC: And, well, because there is a record.   
LC:  Of what?  
JC: More often than not, his words are backed up by a record of 
performance. So when he talks about something; it becomes serious. 
And yet the interesting pattern is that, whenever he enters a new political 
realm—local politics in Davao, national politics, and now geopolitics—
he is often initially viewed as a curiosity. But then he eventually gets 
taken more seriously. Of course, the process is never completely the 
same, but there are parallelisms, even if the contexts are different. 
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In Davao, nobody understood how he won the mayor’s office. 
Even when he initially became vice mayor, nobody saw him as a name 
to reckon with. He was a kind of oddity: Who is this government 
prosecutor who joined the anti-Marcos parliament of the streets? And 
yet he became mayor. 
Same thing nationally, and potentially, globally. Remember Time 
magazine also represented him as a kind of oddity, as the “punisher” 
from Davao. But then, he managed to win the election even if 
nobody thought he could. He did so by targeting specific regions 
and areas where he thought he’d have a better chance, similar to his 
Davao strategy. He targeted specific regions, and he consolidated the 
Mindanao vote. 
LC: And, of course, the National Capital Region.  
JC: Yes, NCR. Early in his campaign, he didn’t target NCR, though. 
It was only later, I think, that they found some potential, because their 
initial targets were Mindanao, Ilocos, and much of the Visayas, with 
the exception of the Ilonggo area. 
It tells you something about the way his mind works; he can see 
political opportunity from a mile away, whether locally, nationally, or 
globally. So he won nationally using a vantage point that very few had.
He makes risky calculations. Just like his statements against the 
American president. Those were bold statements unheard of from 
previous Philippine presidents. But then that endeared him to other 
powers in the region. It’s too early to say if that was really shrewd, and 
we don’t know yet if it will be beneficial. It could have been calculation, 
or there may be an element of luck. 
What is obvious is that he reads political situations quite well. 
How do we predict what he does in the future? It might be good to 
look at the intersecting political processes and various constituencies 
that he has navigated in the past.
